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Abstract
Purpose – Despite the increasing availability of ﬁnancing programs for innovation, micro, small and
medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) often ﬁnd it difﬁcult to access credit for their projects. Among the
reasons, the lack of the types of guarantees required by ﬁnancial institutions stands out. Focused on this
problem, in 2013, the Regional Bank for the Development of the Extreme South (BRDE) created a policy to
stimulate innovation, making the required guarantees for ﬁnancing operations of innovative companies more
ﬂexible: the BRDE Inova Program. This paper aims to analyze the guarantees used in the bank operations
since the beginning of the program.
Design/methodology/approach – In the ﬁrst stage of the research, the authors identiﬁed the
guarantees used in each of the signed contracts, through a documentary survey. Next, semi-structured
interviews showed the perceptions of the players involved in the innovation ecosystem of the state of
Santa Catarina, regarding aspects related to the guarantees. Speciﬁcally, the authors investigated the
following elements: strengths and limitations of the programs regarding access to credit for innovation;
adequacy of existing guarantee mechanisms. To strengthen the conclusions, they used triangulated data
collection in different stages.
Findings – The results showed that, on the one hand, the initiative helped BRDE to consolidate itself as the
main ﬁnancing agent of innovation in MSMEs; on the other hand, the need for traditional guarantees still
plays a signiﬁcant role for innovativeMSMEs to access credit.
© Richard Cunha Schmidt and Micheline Gaia Hoﬀmann. Published in Innovation & Management
Review. Published by Emerald Publishing Limited. This article is published under the Creative
Commons Attribution (CC BY 4.0) licence. Anyone may reproduce, distribute, translate and create
derivative works of this article (for both commercial and non-commercial purposes), subject to full
attribution to the original publication and authors. The full terms of this licence may be seen at http://
creativecommons.org/licences/by/4.0/legalcode
The authors wish to thank the Santa Catarina Research Foundation (FAPESC) for the resources
received to carry out this research.
Guarantees
used in
refundable
ﬁnancing
253
Received 19 December 2017
Revised 31 July 2018
Accepted 13 February 2019
Innovation &Management
Review
Vol. 16 No. 3, 2019
pp. 253-268
EmeraldPublishingLimited
2515-8961
DOI 10.1108/INMR-04-2019-0044
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:
www.emeraldinsight.com/2515-8961.htm
Originality/value – In addition to practical implications for the bank and other ﬁnancing agents’ policies,
this paper contributes to ﬁll a gap in the literature on guarantee systems applied to the speciﬁcities of
knowledge-intensiveMSMEs.
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1. Introduction
Innovation is a phenomenon of increasing importance in contemporary organizations and
society; it is associated with productivity growth (OECD, 2005), competitiveness (Borges &
Hoffmann, 2017; Zen & Fracasso, 2012), and the development of nations (Schumpeter, 1982).
However, companies' own resources are insufﬁcient to support their investments in
innovation (Corder & Salles Filho, 2009; OECD, 2005). Therefore, they need other ﬁnancing
sources to make new projects feasible, and the entrepreneur needs credit to make new
combinations in the means of production (Schumpeter, 1982).
In a scenario of economic and ﬁscal crisis, where resources are scarcer, refundable credit
from development banks, under speciﬁc conditions for the needs of innovative ﬁrms, is an
alternative for stimulating innovation in companies and an instrument of anti-cyclical
economic policy. Although the federal government provides speciﬁc reimbursable ﬁnancing
programs for innovation investments, micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs)
face serious difﬁculties to access these resources. Among other reasons, the lack of
guarantees required by ﬁnancial institutions to fund MSMEs operations is very relevant
because investment in ﬁxed assets tends to be relatively smaller (Luo, Wang, & Yang, 2016;
Nicolae & Daniel, 2011; Zica & Martins, 2008). Although technology is one of the most
determinant assets of companies' success, usually it is not accepted as collateral due to the
difﬁculty in estimating themonetary value of intangible assets (Jang & Chang, 2008).
Although there are different initiatives in the world to circumvent the problem, each
instrument has its own limitations. Particularly in developing countries, these mechanisms
are not always available or are at an early stage. Given this scenario, the Regional Bank for
the Development of the Extreme South (BRDE) created the BRDE Inova Program in 2013,
which enables a greater ﬂexibility compared to the guarantees conventionally required in
the ﬁnancing of innovative projects. Almost all resources passed on by BRDE come from the
National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) and the Funding Agency for
Innovation and Research (Finep). BRDE Inova has essentially used funds from the programs
“Finep Inovacred” and “BNDES Innovative MSME.”
From an academic perspective, the impact of credit guarantees, especially for MSMEs, is a
topic that has received increasing attention (Nicolae &Daniel, 2011). In the systematic review of
the literature, carried out in the preliminary stage of this research, we found that, on one side,
there are a growing number of publications related to credit, guarantees and innovation, or to
MSMEs; on the other hand, there are few studies on speciﬁc guarantee schemes for innovative
or technological companies or sectors. Of the 22 papers that resulted from the systematic
review, four were published in the 1990s, ﬁve between 2000 and 2009, and the remaining 13
papers between 2010 and February 2016. Only one of the articles dealt speciﬁcally with
guarantee schemes and funding to knowledge-intensive companies (Jang& Chang, 2008), while
most of them addressed guarantee systems forMSMEs ﬁnancing.
Therefore, we propose the following research question: How does the guarantee system
adopted by “BRDE Inova” meet the requirements of knowledge-intensive MSMEs,
regarding their credit needs for innovation? To answer this question, this article examined
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the appropriateness of the guarantees used in the refundable ﬁnancing operations of the
“BRDE Inova” program to the needs of knowledge-intensive MSMEs.
For this purpose, in a ﬁrst stage, we surveyed all operations that used funds from the
programs Inovacred and Innovative MSMEs, since the creation of BRDE Inova. The
purpose was to classify and analyze the guarantees that enabled these companies to get
credit for innovation. By examining each of the contracted projects, our research offers an
additional contribution compared to studies that focused their analyses at the programs’
level. Next, we sought to identify how players of the innovation ecosystem of the state of
Santa Catarina, who have used these programs, see the access of knowledge-intensive
MSMEs to innovation ﬁnancing, especially regarding the required guarantees. From the
documentary survey and the interviews conducted herein, we present a triangulated data
research to provide better support for the analysis.
2. The guarantees’ issue regarding credit for innovation in micro, small and
medium-sized enterprises
MSMEs are one of the main sources of innovation, productivity and economic growth
(OECD, 2006). They are the engine of the world economy, providing a large number of jobs,
creating entrepreneurial spirit and technical innovation (Luo et al., 2016). However, they face
barriers stemming from the high costs of innovation activities, the shortage of appropriate
sources of ﬁnancing and excessive economic risks. For these companies, equity is the main
source of funding for innovative activities (IBGE, 2013). However, they lack resources to
carry out innovation projects and face more troubles in getting external funding than larger
ﬁrms, which hinders their investments in innovation (OECD, 2005) and reduces the
country's ability to create virtuous circles of growth and development (Corder & Salles
Filho, 2009).
There are many reasons for credit restriction faced by MSMEs, and among them the lack
of guarantees (Nicolae & Daniel, 2011; Zica & Martins, 2008), information asymmetry
(Luo et al., 2016; Zica & Martins, 2008), and the relatively higher cost of operations
(Baumgartner & Casarotto Filho, 2001; Santos, 2006) stand out. A survey on credit in the
state of São Paulo shows that 61 per cent of the formal MSMEs do not have access to credit,
and 40 per cent of the companies mentioned the shortage of guarantees as the main inhibitor
to ﬁnancing (Sebrae-SP, 2006). Even in developed countries such as Australia, the scarcity of
guarantees is a signiﬁcant problem for accessing credit (Sabatini-Marques, Yigitcanlar, &
Costa, 2015), which hinders the achievement of ﬁnancing, although resources are available
and ﬁnancial institutions are interested in these operations (Baumgartner & Casarotto Filho,
2001). Guarantees are disciplinary mechanisms that encourage less risky behaviors, and
have the role of mitigating risks arising from information asymmetry, which, especially in
the case of MSMEs, add to the shortage and low quality of information. Their absence
increases risk perception by ﬁnancial agents (Santos, 2006). Guarantees constitute a higher
personal and asset commitment from the borrower (Baumgartner & Casarotto Filho, 2001).
The basic (or traditional) guarantees used in long-term ﬁnancing are the real guarantees
and the personal or ﬁdejussory guarantees (Borges, 1999; Casagrande, 2001). The real
guarantees consist of the delivery or offer of movables, real estate, livestock or credit rights
(Casagrande, 2001), i.e. they focus on speciﬁc assets or things (Borges, 1999) and not on the
debtor’s freedom (Borges, 1999; Zica & Martins, 2008). The most used ones are mortgage,
ﬁduciary alienation and pledge (Borges, 1999). In addition, there are other types of real
guarantees, such as the assignment of claims as collateral (Casagrande, 2001; Fortuna, 2008)
and the antichresis (Casagrande, 2001).
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Fidejussory or personal guarantees are those given by individuals or legal entities that
assume the obligation to honor a particular ﬁnancial commitment, in case of default of the
main debtor (Araújo, 2014). In this case, the guarantor's assets ensure the debt payment
(Casagrande, 2001). The endorsement and the guarantee are among ﬁdejussory guarantees
(Borges, 1999; Casagrande, 2001).
2.1 Speciﬁcities of knowledge-intensive micro, small and medium-sized enterprises
The problem of access to credit guarantees is bigger in knowledge-intensive or technology-
intensive companies (Associação Brasileira das Empresas de Software, 2016; Garcia-
Tabuenca & Crespo-Espert, 2010). This should be carefully taken into consideration in
public policies that stimulate Science, Technology and Innovation (ST&I), given the
relevance of these companies for a country’s technological development. Buainain, Lima and
Corder (2017) emphasize the importance, particularly in Brazil, of funding mechanisms to
consider the speciﬁcities of knowledge-intensive sectors, critical for changing the
characteristics of the country's production structure, still dominated by competitive sectors
based on resources and scale. For these authors, the proposition of national policies to
change this structure did not succeed, partly because of the inadequacy of the ﬁnancing
instruments.
Regarding the adequacy of the main real basic guarantees, on the one hand, mortgage
has the advantage of enforcing the whole set represented by the production unit’s
property (Borges, 1999); ﬁduciary alienation has a fast process of guarantee enforcement
(Fortuna, 2008); and pledge can be used in some cases where the previous types cannot
(Borges, 1999). However, innovative MSMEs rarely have assets they can offer as
collateral.
Likewise, the issue of ﬁdejussory guarantees is also critical for MSMEs. Getting these
guarantees can increase the costs for the credit borrower, and the guarantor may still require
counter-guarantees to grant it. In addition, the enforcement of this type of guarantees can be
slow (Borges, 1999). This set precludes this modality.
Our objective was to understand these different types of guarantee and their implications
for accessing credit by knowledge-intensive MSMEs. The following section details the
research steps and themethodological procedures associated to them.
3. Methodological procedures
The research approach is qualitative, and we carried it out in two steps. First, we
identiﬁed and ranked the guarantees used by BRDE in its innovation ﬁnancing
operations, since the launching of BRDE Inova Program[1], in 2013, until the end of
2016. This survey was limited to the contracts signed under the programs Finep
Inovacred and BNDES Innovative MSME, which are the refundable ﬁnancing
programs for innovation operated by BRDE speciﬁcally for MSMEs with annual
revenues up to R$90m. The period 2013-2016 comprises all the closed ﬁnancial years
since 2013, until the writting of this paper, and includes the release of BNDES MSME
Program, in 2014. At this stage, we used the documentary research for data collection
by examining documents from BRDE’s information system and the contracts signed
with the companies.
In the second stage, we sought the perceptions of the players of the innovation ecosystem
of the state of Santa Catarina regarding the adequacy of the program for knowledge-
intensive MSMEs to ﬁnance their innovation projects, considering the types of guarantees
adopted for their credit needs. Speciﬁcally, we examined:
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 strengths and limitations of the programs regarding the access to credit for
innovation; and
 appropriateness of existing guarantee mechanisms.
To this end, we conducted semi-structured interviews with representatives of different
companies and institutions relevant to the state’s innovation ecosystem. We interviewed
members of four institutions and two entrepreneurs with experience in these programs, as
described in Table I.
Interviewees and their institutions/companies:
(1) Interviewee 1:
 Institution: Brazilian Association of Software Companies – Abes.
 Link: Director of Innovation and Promotion.
(2) Interviewee 2:
 Institution: Reference Centers in Innovative Technologies – Certi Foundation.
 Link: Investment Analyst.
(3) Interviewee 3:
 Institution: Regional Bank for the Development of the Extreme South - BRDE.
 Link: Santa Catarina State Superintendent.
(4) Interviewee 4:
 Company: Chipus Microeletrônica S.A. (2008) – semiconductors.
 Link: Co-Founder Partner and CEO.
(5) Interviewee 5:
 Company: Ahgora Sistemas S.A. – management and control services based on
cloud computing.
 Link: Partner and Director.
(6) Interviewee 6:
 Institution: Santa Catarina Association of Technology Companies – ACATE.
 Link: Executive Director.
We used descriptive and content analysis as methodological techniques. To strengthen the
research ﬁndings, we used triangulated data collected in the different stages (Zappellini &
Feuerschütte, 2015).
Table I.
BRDE Contracts
under programs
inovacred and
innovative MSME
between 2013 and
2016
Program
2013 2014 2015 2016 Total
R$m N R$m N R$m N R$m N R$m N
Inovacred 17.2 6 48.3 20 57.5 21 66.3 38 189.4 85
Innovative MSMEa – 0 75.6 51 57.3 32 31.9 15 164.8 98
Total 17.2 6 123.9 71 114.9 53 98.2 53 354.2 183
Notes: aThe decrease in the number and value of operations in the BNDES Innovative MSME Program
may relate to changes in interest rates, which raised from annual 4% in 2014 to 6.5% in 2015, and a variable
rate in 2016 (BNDES, 2014, 2015, 2016), higher than in previous years
Source: Based on information from the BRDE CUBOS system
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4. Analysis and discussion of results
4.1 Guarantees used by Regional Bank for the Development of the Extreme South in
refundable ﬁnancing of innovation
This section describes and analyzes the guarantees used by BRDE in credit operations
under the programs Finep Inovacred and BNDES Innovative MSME, between 2013 and
2016. Table I presents the results of this survey.
Once identiﬁed the operations, we examined the types of guarantees in each contract. It
was thus possible to determine the number and total value of the contracts that used each of
the different types of guarantees. Figure 1 presents these results.
In general, the endorsement of partners or related companies is required in almost all
funding operations and, therefore, it is the most used type of guarantee. Mortgage comes
next, which shows the importance of real guarantees for getting credit, even in innovation
projects. The guarantee programs operated by BRDE (BNDES FGI and Sebrae Fampe) are
particularly relevant due to the special conditions set out by BRDE Inova, which commonly
uses these programs in combination with other types of guarantees, or requirements that
replace the guarantees. It is also worth noting that only one operation used the guarantee
provided by a SGC, which shows the initial stage of this guarantee system.
The endorsement was the type of guarantee present in almost all contracts examined. It
is an attribute of a credit title, in which the guarantor, through his/her signature, becomes
co-responsible for the obligations of the borrower (Borges, 1999); hence, it is only valid for a
credit title and never for another instrument (Fortuna, 2008). It is a full guarantee and
represents solidarity (Casagrande, 2001; Fortuna, 2008). However, to achieve practical
effects, both the guarantee and the endorsement require the guarantor to have moral repute
and ability to pay, according to the transaction (Casagrande, 2001). As a disadvantage, there
may be delay and insecurity regarding the procedural and legal rituals for the enforcement
(Borges, 1999).
In the case of BRDE, it requires the endorsement of partners, controllers or company
managers in most of the operations. In the BRDE Inova Program, under certain conditions,
the endorsement of a third party with a privileged asset situation may be used, in addition to
the guarantees provided by the endorsement programs.
In special situations, the endorsement can be waived, if it is difﬁcult to grant fundings
and there are other guarantees that make the operation safe. Our research identiﬁed that the
Figure 1.
Number and value of
BRDE contracts in
the speciﬁc
innovation programs
between 2013 and
2016, by type of
guarantee
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endorsement participated as a guarantee in 180 of the 183 contracts, according to the data
presented in Table II.
Mortgage, on the other hand, is a type of guarantee that gives the creditor the privilege in
the enforcement of a property, as well as incorporated buildings or movables (Borges, 1999).
In case of non-payment of the debt, there may be judicial execution and the asset given as
guarantee will go to judicial auction to pay the debt, excluding other creditors, who will only
be entitled to the remains, if there is any (Canevari, 2013).
The mortgage’s advantage is the possibility of “closed door” execution, which is the
enforcement of a whole set comprised by the production unit property, including
constructions and equipment necessary for the operation (Borges, 1999). Another beneﬁt is
the possibility of forming different mortgages of the same asset as collateral for different
credit operations (Canevari, 2013).
As disadvantages, some authors mention the precarious situation of the Brazilian land
registries (Borges, 1999), the preference for labor and tax creditors, and slowness of the
Justice in the enforcement of guarantees (Borges, 1999; Fortuna, 2008). Although mortgage
is still a very useful real guarantee for properties in the Brazilian legal system, it is
increasingly weak nowadays (Canevari, 2013).
In the speciﬁc case of innovation ﬁnancing in MSMEs by BRDE, mortgage was present
in 117 operations, representing 63.9 per cent of the contracts, which amounted to R$278.7m
or 78.7 per cent of the volume ﬁnanced, as shown in Table III:
These data show that the availability of some assets that can be mortgaged (or alienated)
in favor of banks is still a relevant factor for getting refundable credit for innovation. This is
true even for BRDE, which has a policy with special guarantee conditions for innovation
ﬁnancing – the BRDE Inova Program.
Although in many cases the program does not eliminate the demand for mortgage
(or alienation), it enables a large reduction in the percentage of ﬁnancing covered by such
types of guarantees. Thus, a particular asset used as collateral can leverage larger volumes
of funding.
Next, we address the credit guarantee programs used by BRDE – BNDES FGI and
Sebrae Fampe. Together they are the third most relevant type of guarantee.
The guarantee programs try to overcome some of market imperfections by enabling
creditors to transfer part of the ﬁnancing risk to the guarantor entity. Therefore, they
Table III.
Use of mortgage as
guarantee in the
observed operations
Mortgage
Value No. Average value
(R$m) (%) (N) (%) (R$m)
Yes 278.7 78.7 117 63.9 2.4
No 75.5 21.3 66 36.1 1.1
Total 354.2 100.0 183 100.0 1.9
Table II.
Participation of
endorsement in the
observed operations
Endorsement
Value No. Average value
(R$m) (%) (N) (%) (R$m)
Yes 340.6 96.2 179 97.8 1.9
No 13.6 3.8 4 2.2 3.4
Total 354.2 100.0 183 100.0 1.9
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persuade creditors to grant credit to individuals or ﬁrms that otherwise would not be
accepted as clients (Camino & Cardone, 1999). They delegate the basic operation to ﬁnancial
entities, and the end user has no relationship with the program (Pombo&Herrero, 2001).
Most of the modalities of BRDE Inova Program use one of the guarantee programs
operated by BRDE, together with other types of guarantees or requirements that may
replace the complementary guarantees, enabling the establishment of some operations
without the provision of real guarantees.
Table IV shows the relevance of these programs in the composition of guarantees,
regarding the programs Finep Inovacred and BNDES Innovative MSME.
Together, operations with guarantee programs represent 29.8 per cent of the transferred
funds and 51.4 per cent of the contracts signed. The higher participation in the number of
contracts than in the transferred amounts shows the importance of guarantee funds in the
dissemination of credit for innovation, according to the operations’ average value. In
addition, Fampe is only used in operations with micro-ﬁrms. For this reason, the number of
contracts and their average value are lower than those that used FGI.
The following is the ﬁduciary alienation, which guarantees the transfer of asset’s ownership
to the creditor during the ﬁnancing term until its complete payment (Borges, 1999; Fortuna, 2008).
More recently, alienation has been used for real estate purposes (Borges, 1999).
One of the advantages of ﬁduciary alienation is that there is no preference for privileged
creditors, since the debtor no longer owns the alienated assets, even in the case of
bankruptcy or composition (Borges, 1999; Canevari, 2013). In the event of non-payment, the
process for guarantee enforcement is extrajudicial, faster than in the case of mortgage
(Borges, 1999; Canevari, 2013; Fortuna, 2008). Through the alienation institute, credit
operators count on an instrument of unprecedented efﬁciency and agility, which leads to
greater safety in granting credit (Canevari, 2013). In contrast to mortgage, it is not possible
to use the same alienated asset as collateral for other credit operations. Data regarding the
use of this type of guarantee are presented in Table V.
In general, the assets alienated in this type of operation are machines and equipment
necessary to the innovation project. This situation is more common in innovation projects of
the industrial sector, and the values are usually higher, as it can be seen by the average
value of contracts through ﬁduciary alienation (R$3.6m).
Table V.
Use of ﬁduciary
alienation in the
observed operations
Fiduciary alienation
Value No. Average value
(R$m) (%) (N) (%) (R$m)
Yes 107.2 30.3 30 16.4 3.6
No 247 69.7 153 83.6 1.6
Total 354,2 100.0 183 100.0 1.9
Table IV.
Use of guarantee
programs in the
observed operations
Program (Guarantee funds)
Value No. Average value
(R$m) (%) (N) (%) (R$m)
BNDES FGI 98.4 27.8 77 42.1 1.3
Sebrae Fampe 7.1 2.0 17 9.3 0.4
With program 105.5 29.8 94 51.4 1.1
Without program 248.7 70.2 89 48.6 2.8
Total 354.2 100.0 183 100.0 1.9
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Continuing with the most used guarantees, we gathered the ﬁduciary assignment of claims
as collateral and the pledge of receivables or shares in the same group of guarantees for
research purposes. Largely used in the Brazilian ﬁnancial system, the ﬁduciary assignment
of claims as collateral consists of the cession of credit rights to another person, as a payment
method of an obligation (Casagrande, 2001). Credit operations guaranteed by receivables
have been an alternative widely used in the ﬁnancial system (Casagrande, 2001; Fortuna,
2008). They enable longer payment terms, cost reduction, portfolio diversiﬁcation and a
higher credit volume (Fortuna, 2008).
Pledge, on the other hand, is a right of privilege for the execution of an asset, and is
described by a formalized written contract, although it does not require the public form
(Borges, 1999). The contract may be a public or private instrument, or a ballot (Casagrande,
2001). There are several types of pledge:
 civil (delivery of the asset to the creditor);
 ﬁnancial (formalized through credit notes);
 contractual (formalized through contracts);
 rural (directed to agricultural production);
 commercial (guarantees the commercial operation); and
 deposit (pledge of credit securities) (Casagrande, 2001).
Table VI shows these operations.
Representing 10.3 per cent of the volume ﬁnanced, but only 6 per cent of the signed
contracts, the pledge of shares and receivables does not have a signiﬁcant participation in
the number of contracted operations. However, the high average value of operations stands
out, suggesting that these types of guarantees are used in operations with more developed
companies.
Although not properly a type of guarantee, the so-called tariff for guarantees structuring
(TEC) is a way to guarantee the ﬂexibilization provided by the BRDE Inova Program. It
complements the guarantee programs to enable ﬁnancing for innovative MSMEs that do not
possess other types of guarantees. Table VII presents data on its use.
Generally, this mechanism is offered to companies that have no access to another type of
guarantee and, consequently, would not have access to credit for innovation. Although there
is a cost for using such mechanism, it enabled the refundable ﬁnancing of 43 companies. We
highlight the low average value of operations (R$0.7m), which conﬁrms the importance of
this instrument for innovative MSMEs.
In contrast, the guarantee is an autonomous contract in which the guarantor ensures the
payment of a debtor’s obligation, in case he/she cannot pay off his/her debts (Borges, 1999;
Casagrande, 2001; Zica & Martins, 2008). It is an ancillary obligation of a main duty, i.e. an
ancillary contract that guarantees the compliance of another contract’s obligations (Borges,
1999; Casagrande, 2001; Fortuna, 2008). In general, ﬁnancial institutions provide the bank
Table VI.
Use of ﬁduciary
assignment of credit
rights and pledge of
receivables or shares
in the observed
transactions
Value No. Average value
Shares/receivables (R$m) (%) (N) (%) (R$m)
Yes 36.4 10.3 11 6.0 3.3
No 317.8 89.7 172 94.0 1.8
Total 354.2 100.0 183 100.0 1.9
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guarantee (or surety letter) to their best clients to enable them to access credit lines of other
banks (Fortuna, 2008). Often, bank guarantees are valid for one year or less and must be
annually renewed, which can generate costs for companies and become a barrier for long-
term operations.
Table VIII shows the number of operations that used surety letter in the composition of
guarantees.
The small number of transactions with surety letter seems to be related to its high cost.
The low average value of the operations may indicate that it is an instrument used by
smaller companies, precisely because they do not have access to other types of guarantees.
Finally, societies for credit guarantee (SGC) are, in general terms, private companies
whose purpose is to complement the guarantees required by their members in credit
operations (Sebrae, 2009).
Unlike guarantee programs, SGCs have the advantage of dealing with public and private
resources, which results in some co-responsibility for the credit guarantee to the borrower
(Santos, 2006). Their local relationships and the individuals’ concern to watch over their
names or reputation are excellent substitutes for the asset securities and counterparts
(Carvalho & Abramovay, 2004). This enables the reduction of the moral risk of operations
because of the mutual character of these institutions and the implicit peer pressure (Santos,
2006). Finally, SGCs participate in the credit analysis (Mello & Schossland, 2015; Pombo &
Herrero, 2001; Santos, 2006), and they decide to grant or not the guarantee (Santos, 2006).
In the case of BRDE, regarding its credit operations to ﬁnance innovation in MSMEs,
there was only one contract that got the guarantee provided by a SGC.
Although SGCs are solid and relevant institutions in other countries, they are very recent
in Brazil. Understanding why they are still not consolidated locally, with a more widespread
instrument of complementary guarantees, can be a rich ﬁeld of research (Table IX).
4.2 Perceptions of the players of the innovation ecosystem of the state of Santa Catarina on
the problems of real guarantees for innovation ﬁnancing
In this section, we analyze the interviews conducted herein to check the perception of the
research subjects on the strengths and limitations of the programs, regarding access to
credit for innovation, and the adequacy of the existing guarantee mechanisms.
Table VIII.
Use of surety letter in
the observed
operations
Value No. Average value
Surety letter (R$m) (%) (N) (%) (R$m)
Yes 17.4 4.9 15 8.2 1.2
No 336.8 95.1 168 91.8 2.0
Total 354.2 100.0 183 100.0 1.9
Table VII.
Use of TEC in the
observed operations
Value No. Average value
TEC (R$m) (%) (N) (%) (R$m)
Yes 30.5 8.6 43 23.5 0.7
No 323.7 91.4 140 76.5 2.3
Total 354.2 100.0 183 100.0 1.9
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The strengths most cited by the interviewees were the programs’ terms and the subsidized
interest rates. Interviewee 5 praised the funded items, which include important elements that
are unusual in other programs. Among these items are own workforce and expenses for
traveling and consulting.
Interviewee 1 considered the programs’ decentralization positive, with the resources
passed on by regional partners, which enables the capillarity of resource distribution. For
him, the proximity between banks and entrepreneurs can make credit analysis more
efﬁcient, reduce non-payment, simplify processes and loosen guarantees. In the same line,
INTERVIEWEE 4 stated that things would be more complex and slower if his ﬁrm had to
deal directly with BNDES or Finep. The players of the innovation ecosystem of Santa
Catarina highlighted the funded items and decentralization as strengths of the economic
subsidy program, as mentioned by Borges and Hoffmann (2017).
Interviewees 1, 4 and 5 agreed that ﬁnancial products for innovation should be simple
and fast because in general there is no need for big resources to develop an idea; but delay in
releasing them may result in the loss of an opportunity. For Interviewee 1, the entrepreneur
is willing to pay for the credit, but expects agility and safety in the process. He exempliﬁed
his argument by saying that the Product “BNDES Card” was successful due to its
convenience, in addition to the low demand for guarantees and counterparts (Bueno &
Torkomian, 2015).
Interviewee 1 also highlighted the continuous ﬂow of these programs. When the selection
occurs through public calls, there is a high cost involved and human resource overload, from
the public notice to the proposal’s selection. Thus, companies' need for speed can also make
this model unfeasible (Gonçalves, Mello & Torres, 2015).
At this research stage, we investigated the limits of the programs perceived by the
interviewees. The most mentioned were the excess of bureaucracy, process delay, lack of
guarantees, lack of communication and understanding of the programs, legal uncertainty,
lack of qualiﬁcation of some entrepreneurs, speciﬁcities of technology companies, difﬁculty
in designing projects, and relatively high cost of operations with MSMEs. According to
theory, the lack of guarantees and the relatively high cost of operations are the main causes
of credit shortage faced by smaller companies (Baumgartner & Casarotto Filho, 2001;
Nicolae & Daniel, 2011; Pombo & Herrero, 2001; Santos, 2006; Stiglitz &Weiss, 1981; Zica &
Martins, 2008).
Literature presents different deﬁnitions of innovation, and the OsloManual (OECD, 2005)
is the benchmark used by ﬁnancial institutions. However, Interviewees 1, 3 and 5 observed
that deﬁning the innovative merit of projects is a very subjective task. According to
Interviewee 1, banks are insecure to consider a particular project as innovative, and often
deny credit. Thus, Interviewees 1, 2, and 5 suggested that other innovation ﬁnancing
programs adopt objective criteria to determine whether a project or company qualiﬁes as
innovative. Silva (2016) investigated this topic and suggested innovation criteria to support
the selection of projects for the Inovacred Program. In addition, Interviewees 1, 2 and 5
considered essential for banks to know better the most innovative segments. In its
Table IX.
Participation of SGC
in the observed
operations
Value No. Average value
SGC (R$m) (%) (N) (%) (R$m)
Yes 0.6 0.2 1 0.5 0.6
No 353.6 99.8 182 99.5 1.9
Total 354.2 100.0 183 100.0 1.9
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conception, BRDE Inova sought to ﬁll this gap by approaching institutions with expertise in
the ﬁeld of innovation through operational agreements, where partner institutions could
assist the bank in assessing the innovative merit of projects. The Research Foundations
(FAPs) are an example of this type of institution, focused on the ﬁnancing of ST&I projects.
Another obstacle mentioned by Interviewee 1, and highlighted by Baumgartner and
Casarotto Filho (2001), and Santos (2006), regards the relatively high operational costs of
ﬁnancing MSMEs. From their perspective, operational costs of a small operation are
practically the same as a large one, which encumbers smaller companies.
Proceeding to the analysis of the adequacy of the guarantees used in the program,
Interviewees 2 and 4 emphasized the high cost of some types of guarantees, such as surety
letters. In addition, their terms are up to one year, which requires annual renewals for long-
term operations.
Interviewee 4 explained that in knowledge-intensive companies, such as the one where he
is the CEO, it is impossible to make assets tangible for using as collateral. The entrepreneur
recalled when he applied for credit at BRDE, and they considered the bank getting an equity
stake in the company as a guarantee for the funding. At the time, the ﬁrm was in an early
stage and negotiation did not evolve. Thus, as explained by Schumpeter (1982), the
current system acts as an ex-ante selection mechanism, i.e. it already aborts innovation in
the project stage. INTERVIEWEE 5 agreed, and said, “By improving the issue of
guarantees, maybe the virtual barrier for getting credit for innovation decreases.”
In Brazil, there are guarantee programs that aim to minimize credit barriers. BRDE currently
operates with BNDES FGI and Sebrae Fampe. Among the criticisms found in literature, one may
ﬁnd the bureaucracy involved in the analysis, the lack of instruments, and the high endorsement
rates, besides the requirement of additional guarantees (Baumgartner & Casarotto Filho, 2001).
For Interviewees 1 and 2, a major obstacle to FGI and Fampe was the limit of the guarantee
percentage to 80 per cent of the amount funded. “The lack of complementarity makes new
operations unfeasible,” emphasized Interviewee 2. “Although there are good mechanisms and
ideas, something is lacking to cover a gap in the stage of ﬁrms’ growth.”
In an overall review of the adequacy of existing instruments, Interviewee 6 observed that
innovation investments involve risks that must be assigned to creditors. Given the nature of
these projects, failure is a possibility; therefore, it is necessary to create new instruments to
spread the risks. Interviewee 3 observed that little progress has been made on the issue of
guarantees, despite the advances of the ﬁnancial system. Hence, alternative guarantee
instruments are essential, so that these investments are not reduced. Table X summarizes
the main ﬁndings of the interviews.
In short, for the speciﬁc reality of knowledge-intensive MSMEs, among the identiﬁed
limits, one can mention the difﬁculty of establishing tangible assets to be used as collateral
Table X.
Synthesis of
interviewees’
perception on the
programs and
guarantee
mechanisms
Programs’ strengths Programs’ limitations Adequacy of guarantees
Terms
Subsidized interest
Funded items
Decentralization
Continuous ﬂow
Excess of bureaucracy
Slowness
Lack of communication
Difﬁculty of understanding/Lack
of qualiﬁcation of entrepreneurs
Difﬁculty to design projects
Subjectivity in deﬁning the
innovative character of the project
Legal uncertainty
High cost
Term – need for annual renewals
Lack of guarantees
Difﬁculty to make assets tangible
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(ABES, 2016; Garcia-Tabuenca & Crespo-Espert, 2010). Therefore, although the program
has brought possibilities of differential guarantees, there are still limitations associated with
the prevalence of traditional modalities.
5. Final remarks
Although the Brazilian National Innovation System comprises speciﬁc programs for
refundable ﬁnancing of innovation, MSMEs still face difﬁculties to access these resources.
The lack of required guarantees is one of the main barriers.
By enabling differential guarantee conditions, BRDE Inova Program contributed to the
bank becoming the national leader in the transfer of Inovacred and Innovative MPME
programs. Despite the advances, the analysis of funded projects showed that the availability
of assets for mortgage or alienation is a signiﬁcant factor in getting credit for innovation
projects of MSMEs, which is a particularly relevant limit for knowledge-intensive companies.
Therefore, the guarantee mechanisms available do not ﬁt these companies’ needs. Interviews
with entrepreneurs of knowledge-intensive sectors and managers of institutions in
innovation ecosystem of the Santa Catarina showed that such restriction remains.
Besides being a limitation for individual companies, such scenario creates a barrier to the
advancement of the National System of ST&I, whose ﬁnancing mechanisms have structural
problems. The Good Law, which grants tax incentives to companies that invest in Research and
Development (R&D), still does not meet the needs of MSMEs accounting. Resources for non-
refundable ﬁnancing suffer with the decrease of the public budget for innovation and, as we saw,
credit still imposes barriers mainly to knowledge-intensive companies, which are precisely those
that belong to relevant sectors that can change the Brazilian production structure.
Hence, the study shows elements that can contribute to the advancement of ﬁnancing
policies of both BRDE and other ﬁnancial agents of the National Innovation System. Regarding
theoretical implications, it helps to ﬁll the existing gap in the national literature related to the
guarantee systems for innovation credit applied to the reality of knowledge-intensive MSMEs.
In addition, it focuses on a level of analysis not explored in other studies: the project level. By
examining individually the contracted projects, it was possible to draw very speciﬁc
conclusions about the guarantee mechanisms effectively adopted in that program.
In conclusion, we emphasize the relevance of developing Credit Guarantee Companies to
advance in this ﬁeld. SGCs are solid institutions in other countries, but still very incipient in
Brazil. We ﬁnish by suggesting future studies to understand why SGCs have not yet
consolidated in the country as an instrument for providing complementary guarantees.
Note
1. Finep and BNDES programs relate to refundable resources passed on by accredited ﬁnancial
institutions, while the BRDE Inova Program is a policy for stimulating innovation that, among
other things, enables a diﬀerential treatment regarding the guarantees required for innovative
companies and projects.
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